Abstract. Let pk = (N , e) be an RSA public key with corresponding secret key sk = (p, q, d , dp, dq , q −1 p ). Assume that we obtain partial error-free information of sk, e.g., assume that we obtain half of the most significant bits of p. Then there are well-known algorithms to recover the full secret key. As opposed to these algorithms that allow for correcting erasures of the key sk, we present for the first time a heuristic probabilistic algorithm that is capable of correcting errors in sk provided that e is small. That is, on input of a full but error-prone secret key sk we reconstruct the original sk by correcting the faults. More precisely, consider an error rate of δ ∈ [0, 1 2 ), where we flip each bit in sk with probability δ resulting in an erroneous key sk. Our Las-Vegas type algorithm allows to recover sk from sk in expected time polynomial in log N with success probability close to 1, provided that δ < 0.237. We also obtain a polynomial time Las-Vegas factorization algorithm for recovering the factorization (p, q) from an erroneous version with error rate δ < 0.084.
Introduction
RSA is the most widely deployed cryptosystem and has successfully withstood more than 30 years of cryptanalytic attacks [1] . An RSA modulus N = pq is a product of two primes and the key-pair e, d ∈ Z
In the present work, we look at error-prone RSA keys, where we assume that the public information (N , e) is never affected by errors. Thus, we only look at erroneous tuples sk = (p, q, d , d p , d q , q −1 p ). Our error-correction algorithm is motivated by side-channel attacks that are capable of extracting the complete private key but with some errors [5] . We assume that the errors are uniformly spread over the whole secret key, i.e., each secret key bit is flipped with some fixed error probability δ ∈ [0, 1 2 ). Notice that for δ = 1 2 we obtain a completely random string that does not provide any information about sk.
Theoretically, our attack framework is modeled by oracle-assisted attacks on RSA. Oracle-assisted attacks were first introduced by Rivest and Shamir [9] at Eurocrypt 1985. Rivest and Shamir used an oracle that allowed for querying bits of p in chosen positions. They showed that given such an oracle 3 5 log p queries are sufficient to factor N in polynomial time. This was later improved by Coppersmith [3] to only 1 2 log p queries. In 1992, Maurer [8] showed that for stronger oracles, which allow for any type of oracle queries with YES/NO answers, log p queries are sufficient for any > 0.
In this oracle-based line of research, the goal is to minimize both the power of the oracle and the number of queries to the oracle. At Crypto 2009, Heninger and Shacham [6] presented a polynomial time attack on RSA that works whenever a 0.27-fraction of the key bits of sk is given, provided that the given bits are uniformly spread over the whole secret key. So as opposed to the oracle used by Rivest, Shamir and Coppersmith, the attacker has no control about the positions in which he receives some of the bits but he knows the positions and on expectation the erasure intervals between two known bits are never too large.
Notice that all these aforementioned attacks require a limited number of fault-free information provided by the oracles, mostly in the form of secret key bits. Since side-channel attacks are practical instantiations of oracles, in most scenarios it is questionable to put a limit on the number of bits that one can obtain. Why should an attacker stop at some point to extract bits? Why should he not proceed until he has the full bit information? In a more realistic scenario an attacker is capable of extracting the full sk bit string but subject to some errors that were caused by the physical measurements of his side-channel attack. This is the error-prone scenario that we address in our paper. Hence our work might motivate to look for weaker forms of side-channel attacks that produce only erroneous data.
Our result and related work. We present the first attack running in expected polynomial time that recovers a secret key sk from a disturbed secret key sk, where every bit is flipped with a fixed error rate of δ < 0.237. That is, we allow for error correction of an RSA secret key, provided that the public RSA exponent is small. We also give results where an attackers obtains an erroneous version for a subset of the entries of sk = (p, q, d , d p , d q , q −1 p ). E.g., we obtain a polynomial time attack for erroneous versions of (p, q, d ) with error rates δ < 0.160. Moreover, we obtain a polynomial time factorization algorithm that factors N given a faulty version of (p, q) with error rate δ < 0.084. In this case, we do not need any restriction on the public exponent e.
Our work builds on the erasure correction algorithm of Heninger-Shacham [6] which allows for erasures of the secret key bits of sk with an erasure rate of δ < 0.73. So as one might expect from coding theory, the correction of errors seems to be a much harder problem than the correction of erasures.
As our work builds on the Heninger-Shacham algorithm, let us briefly recall the idea of this construction. Heninger and Shacham recover the parameters p, q, d , d p , d q bit by bit in a 2-adic fashion by growing a search tree. In their algorithm, the information from q −1 p is ignored. The nodes in depth k of the search tree correspond to partial solutions of p mod 2 k , q mod 2 k , . . . , d q mod 2 k . Since in the erasure correction scenario, one has fragmentary but correct key material, one can easily prune partial solutions that do not coincide with the known secret key bits. This process will never discard the correct solution, since the correct solution will always fully agree with the incomplete key material. Thus, such an algorithm will always succeed to recover sk.
The only remaining problem is to bound the algorithm's running time. Intuitively, whenever one has sufficiently many key bits to falsify incorrect partial solutions, one will obtain a bounded number of false partial solutions per iteration and so the total number of nodes in the search tree will stay small. Heninger and Shacham showed that with high probability the total number of partial solutions is quadratic in log(N ) whenever the erasure rate is smaller than 0.73, i.e., we know at least a 0.27-fraction of the key bits. In order to show this result, Heninger and Shacham had to make the heuristic assumption that once a key candidate differs from the correct key, the subsequent candidate key bits are distributed uniformly at random.
Clearly, the Heninger-Shacham comparison of key candidates with the given key material cannot naively been transferred to the error correction scenario. The reason is that a disagreement of a key candidate may originate from an incorrect key candidate or from faulty bits of the key material. Thus, in our construction we do no longer compare bit by bit but we compare larger blocks of bits. More precisely, we grow subtrees of depth t for each key candidate. This results in 2 t new candidates which we all compare with our faulty key material. If the bit agreement with our key material in these t bits is above some threshold parameter C we keep the candidate, otherwise we discard it.
Clearly, we obtain a trade-off for the choice t of the depth of our subtrees. On the one hand, t cannot be chosen too large since in each iteration wae grow our search tree by at least 2 t candidates. Thus, t must be bounded by O(log log N ) in order to guarantee a polynomial size of the search tree.
On the other hand, depending on the error rate t has to be chosen sufficiently large to guarantee that the correct key candidate has large agreement with our key material sk in each t successive bit positions, such that the correct candidate will never be discarded during the execution of our algorithm. Moreover, t has to be large enough such that the distribution corresponding to the correct candidate and the distribution derived from an incorrect candidate are separable by some threshold parameter C . If this property does not hold, we obtain too many faulty candidates for the next iteration.
We show that the above trade-off restrictions can be fulfilled whenever we have an error rate δ < 0.237 − for some fixed > 0. That is, if we choose t of size polynomial in log log N and 1 , we are able to define a threshold parameter C such that the following holds.
1. With probability close to 1 the correct key candidate will never be discarded during the execution of the algorithm. 2. For fixed > 0, our algorithm will consider no more than an expected total number of log O(1) N key candidates. E.g., our algorithm has expected running time polynomial in the bit-size of N .
We would like to point out that our proper choice of t and C assumes that we know a good upper bound for the error rate δ. In practical side-channel attacks where δ might be unknown to an attacker, one can apply an additional search step which successively increases the value of δ until a solution is found. Alternatively, we provide a way to compute an equate upper bound for δ during the initialization phase of the algorithm.
Our algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm of Las Vegas type, i.e., whenever it outputs a solution the output is the correct secret key sk. Our error correction algorithm is elementary. The main work that has to be done is to carefully choose the subtree depth t and the threshold parameter C , such that all tradeoff restrictions hold. We achieve this goal by using a statistical analysis via Hoeffding bounds. Our analysis relies on a similar heuristic assumption as in [6] , that is, as soon as a key candidate differs from the correct solution its subsequent bits are distributed uniformly at random.
Furthermore, we would like to stress that analogous to [6] , our algorithm is restricted to the case of small public exponents e -except for the case of correcting erroneous factorizations (p, q). Small public exponent RSA appears to be the standard in practical applications [11] .
We ran experiments to verify the predictions of our theoretical analysis and to validate the heuristic assumption. In practice, we achieved to correct error rates of up to δ = 0.2 for 1024-bit RSA private keys with good success probabilities in a matter of seconds.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we briefly review the HeningerShacham algorithm. Section 4 introduces our new block-based threshold algorithm that grows subtrees of depth t. Section 5 is devoted to the theoretical analysis of the subtree depth t and the choice of the threshold parameter for pruning nodes that correspond to incorrect candidates. Experimental results are given in Section 6.
Notation and Mathematical Background
For an n-bit string x = (x n−1 , . . . , x 0 ) ∈ {0, 1} n let x [i ] = x i denote the i -th bit of x (where x [0] is the least significant bit of x) and let
for i ≥ j . Throughout the paper we denote by ln(n) the natural logarithm of n to base e and we denote by log(n) the binary logarithm of n to base 2.
The main technical tool used in our analysis is Hoeffding's bound [7] , which upper bounds the absolute error of sums of independent random variables from their mean value. Theorem 1. Let X 1 , . . . , X n be a sequence of independent Bernoulli trials with identical success probability Pr[
A slightly more general version of Hoeffding's inequality allows for each random variable X i an individual expectation E[X i ] as well as a wider range, i.e.
and the above statement transforms to
(1)
The Heninger-Shacham Algorithm
Let (N , e) be an RSA public key with corresponding PKCS#1 standard secret
We will ignore the last parameter q
as it is not used in the attack. Let N be the product of two It is not hard to see that all parameters p, q, d , d p , d q alone reveal the factorization of N , see [4] . Thus, the secret key is a highly redundant representation of the prime factorization. This redundancy in turn implies that the following four RSA identities simultaneously hold
for some parameters k , k p and k q that we are able to compute for small public exponents e.
We have 0 < k < e d φ(N ) < e, so there are at most e −1 possible candidates for k . Therefore, we can brute-force search over all candidate values for k . Following an argument of Boneh, Durfee and Frankel [2] , for each candidate value k , we define
which differs for the right choice k = k from d by k (p+q) e < p + q. Thus, for the right candidate choice of k the values of d (k ) and d agree roughly on half of their most significant bits.
In the erasure correction scenario, Heninger and Shacham simply compare each candidate d (k ) with the given fragmentary version of d in order to determine k uniquely with overwhelming probability.
We proceed similarly in the error correction szenario. Assume that we obtain some error-prone secret key
which is derived from sk by flipping each bit individually with some fixed probability δ ∈ [0, 1 2 ). Intuitively, if δ is significantly below 1 2 , then among all e − 1 candidates d (k ), k = 1, . . . , e − 1, the Hamming distance between the upper half most significant bits of d (k ) andd should be minimal for the correct choice k = k . In Appendix A, we show that this is true with overwhelming probability for the error rates δ that we allow.
This means that we can learn the unknown k in Eq. (3). Moreover, we can immediately correct almost half of the most significant bits of d . Notice that this information is not useful in the Heninger-Shacham algorithm as one stops to recover the secret key bits when reaching bit n 2 − 1. However, we can use this information to compute a good approximationδ of the error rate δ. Therefore, we simply compute the normalized Hamming distance of d (k ) andd bỹ
For n large enough and any fixed tolerance > 0, we have δ ≤δ + with overwhelming probability. That is, in our asymptotic analysis it is reasonable to assume that the algorithm knows an upper bound of the error rate δ. For practical values of n, one can easily show that
where = 0.037 for n = 1024, see App. B for more details. Now that we are able to compute k , Heninger and Shacham show that this directly allows us to compute candidates for (k p , k q ). If e is prime then there are only two candidate values. In general, for e with m different prime factors there exist up to 2 m candidates. So one has to run 2 m copies of the HeningerShacham algorithm in parallel. Since m = O(log e) and since we consider small public exponent RSA only, this factor can be neglected. We denote this whole precomputation process by (k , k p , k q ) ← Init(N , e). Now let us start to reconstruct a secret key in a bitwise manner. Since p, q are odd primes, we have p[0] = q[0] = 1 and 2|p −1 as well as 2|q −1. Let τ (x ) denote the largest exponent such that 2 τ (x ) divides x , i.e. τ (x ) := max{k ∈ N : 2 k |x }. From Eq. (4), we obtain ed p = 1 mod 2 1+τ (kp ) .
Thus, we can immediately correct the least 1 + τ (k p ) bits of d p from the knowledge of e and k p . Analogously, we can compute from Eq. (5) the 1 + τ (k q ) least significant bits of d q and from Eq. (3) the 2 + τ (k ) least significant bits of d . Moreover, if we fix all bits
For odd k p this means that changing the i -th bit on the right hand side of Eq. (4) changes the corresponding i -th bit on the left hand side. Shifting by τ (k p ) on the right-hand side translates the change to position i + τ (k p ) on the left hand side.
Thus, Heninger and Shacham define for each bit index i a so-called i -th bit slices, which we denote by
Let Slice(0) ← Mount(e, k , k p , k q ) be the computation of the initial first bit slice consisting of the steps described above, i.e., we set
where the last three entries can be easily computed once k , k p and k q are known. The running time of Mount(·) can be neglected in our small public exponent RSA scenario.
Lifting solutions. Assume that we have computed a partial solution sk 
This means we have four linearly independent equations in the five unknowns
of Slice(i ). Therefore, each Hensel lift yields exactly two candidate solutions. We denote this lifting process by
In the erasure correction scenario, Heninger and Shacham use their knowledge of the correct secret key bits to prune incorrect candidates produced by the lifting process. The analysis in [6] mainly shows that the number of candidates is sufficiently upper bounded as long as enough secret key bits are available.
Notice that in our error correction scenario, such a simple pruning is not possible, since a disagreement of Slice(i ) with the corresponding bits of sk might be due to errors in our faulty secret key.
Blockwise Threshold-Based Vector Correction

Generic Description
In this section, we present our new algorithm for error correction. We would like to point out that our construction is a generic, elementary algorithm for reconstructing arbitrary unknown tuples of bit vectors x given only a corrupted versionx and some public information on x, which does not directly allow for extracting x. For example, x may be the prime factorization of some public N .
In coding theory language, our construction resembles a maximum likelihood approach. In each iteration, we keep those vectors that are locally closest tox in the Hamming distance. Hopefully, we are also able to discard many incorrect partial solutions due to our public information.
Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ). In a nutshell, our algorithm tries to reconstruct x iteratively by calculating a block of t bits of each of x 1 , . . . , x m in each iteration. The algorithm proceeds in four phases, where the second and third phase are iterated until the candidates have the same bitlength as x.
Initialization phase: Use the public information to compute some initial partial solution to x. This initialization is optional and may result in the empty string as the only partial solution.
Expansion phase: Each partial solution is lifted for the next t most significant bits, i.e., we compute the next t bits of each of x 1 , . . . , x m . Per partial solution this will result in up to 2 mt new partial solutions. By using our public information, we may hope to obtain considerably less than 2 mt candidates.
Pruning phase: For every new partial solution we count the number of matches of the mt expanded bits with the corresponding bits ofx. If this number is below some threshold parameter C then we discard the partial solution.
Finalization phase: We test with the help of our public information whether one of our candidate solutions is indeed equal to the desired x.
Obviously, the choice of the blocksize t is crucial for our algorithm. Since the number of partial solutions in the expansion phase grows exponentially in t, we cannot allow for large parameters t. On the other hand, we cannot choose t too small, because we have to make sure that during the pruning phase the following two properties hold.
-The correct partial solution -the one that can be expanded to the desired x -is pruned only with small probability. -Sufficiently many incorrect solutions are pruned such that the total number of candidates can be minimized.
Error Correction for RSA keys
Let us now specialize the generic description from the previous section to our RSA error correction scenario. We want to compute some unknown RSA secret Initialization phase: 
. If all equations hold, output sk .
Notice that during the Expansion phase for every partial solution we only obtain 2 t new candidates for the 5t new bits instead of the naive 2 5t candidates. This is due to the clever usage of our public information in the Expand(·) procedure of Heninger and Shacham.
In the subsequent section, we will analyze the probability that our algorithm succeeds in computing the secret key sk. We will show that a choice of t = θ( ln n 2 ) will be sufficient for error rates δ < 0.237 − . The threshold parameter C will be chosen such that the correct partial solution will survive each pruning phase with probability close to 1 and such that we expect that the number of candidates per iteration is bounded by 2 t+1 . For every fixed > 0, this leads to an expected running time that is polynomial in n.
Choice of Parameters and Success / Runtime Analysis
We now give a detailed analysis for algorithm Error-Correction from the previous section. Afterwards, we show that this analysis easily generalizes to settings where an attacker obtains instead of a faulty version of all five parameters in sk only faulty versions of e.g. (p, q, d ) or (p, q).
Full Analysis for the RSA Case
Remember that in algorithm Error-Correction, we count the number of matching bits between 5t-bit blocks of sk and every partial candidate solution. Let us define a random variable X c for the number of matching bits between sk and a correct partial solution.
The distribution of X c is clearly the binomial distribution with parameters 5t and probability (1 − δ), denoted by X c ∼ Bin(5t, 1 − δ). That is, we have
for γ = 0, . . . , 5t. The expected number of matches is thus E[X c ] = 5t(1 − δ). Assume that we expand some incorrect partial solution (p , q , d , d p , d q ) by 5t bits to 2 t new candidates. We let the random variable X b represent the number of matching bits of sk with the expanded 5t bits of these bad candidates.
In order to analyze the distribution of X b , we make use of the following heuristic assumption which follows directly from the heuristic assumption of Heninger-Shacham [6] when applied to t-bit blocks.
Heuristic 2. Every solution generated by applying the expansion phase to an incorrect partial solution is an ensemble of t randomly chosen bit slices.
That is under Heuristic 2, every expansion of an incorrect candidate in ErrorCorrection results in an additional 5t uniformly random bits.
Heninger and Shacham verified the validity of this heuristic experimentally. Under Heuristic 2 we see that
Now, we basically have to choose our threshold C such that the two distributions are sufficiently separated. The remainder of this section is devoted to proof our main result.
Main Theorem 3. Under Heuristic 2 for every fixed > 0 the following holds. Let (N , e) be an RSA public key with n-bit N and fixed e. We choose t = ln(n) (2) 10 and C = 5t(
Further, let sk = (p,q,d ,d p ,d q ) be an RSA secret key with noise rate
Then algorithm Error-Correction corrects sk in expected time O n 2+ ln (2) 5 2 with success probability at least 1 − Remark. Notice that for sufficiently large n, t converges to infinity and thus γ 0 converges to ln (2) 10 ≈ 0.263. This means that Error-Correction asymptotically allows for error rates Proof. The proof of our main theorem is organized as follows. First, we upper bound the expected number of bad solutions that arise in each iteration of the algorithm. Second, we show that our correct solution survives all pruning steps with probability close to 1. Third, we upper bound the total number of partial solutions that arise during the execution of Error-Correction and conclude that Error-Correction runs in polynomial time.
Let the random variables Y i represent the number of incorrect partial solutions that pass the threshold comparison in the pruning phase of the i -th iteration of Error-Correction. Proof. Define two random variables Z g and Z b as follows: Z g denotes the number of bad candidates arising from the unique correct solution, Z b counts the number of bad candidates generated from a single bad partial solution. It is not hard to see that
More generally, we obtain
Now, we aim at upper bounding
Therefore, we define 2 t random variables Z 
E[Z
2 ) is defined as in (13). Applying Hoeffding's bound (Theorem 1) directly yields
This implies
2 < 1 and we can simplify equation (14) to
Lemma 5. Error-Correction succeeds with probability at least 1−
Proof. The probability of pruning the correct solution at one single round is given by Pr[X c < C ], where X c ∼ Bin(5t, 1 − δ) as defined in (12). Using 
Since algorithm Error-Correction runs τ (n) ≤ n 2t + 1 rounds, the total success probability is given by
Proof. The total expected runtime T of Error-Correction is given by
where T Init , T Mount and T main represent the runtime of the procedures Init, Mount and the main loop of Error-Correction, respectively. Recall that a factor of O(e) arises from the fact that Init(·) possibly outputs up to e candidate tuples (k , k p , k q ). Since we assume e to be fixed, we can neglect T Init as well as T Mount and obtain T = O(T main ).
In order to upper bound T main , we upper bound the runtime needed by the expansion and pruning phase for one single partial solution:
-During the expanding phase, each partial solution implies the computation of t−1 i=0 2 i < 2 t equation systems given by the equations (8)- (11). The right hand sides of equations (8)- (11) can be computed in time O(n) -when storing the results of the previous iteration. This yields a total computation time of O(n2 t ) for the expanding phase. -The pruning phase can be realized in time O(t) for each of the fresh 2 t partial solutions, summing up to O(t2 t ).
We can upper bound t ≤ n, which results in an overall runtime of O((n +t)·2 t ) = O(n2 t ) per candidate. An application of Lemma 4 yields an upper bound for the expected total number of partial solutions examined during the whole execution which is given by
Putting both together finally yields
Combining Lemma 5 and 6 proves the Main Theorem.
Although theoretically Lemma 6 gives us a polynomial running time for every fixed > 0, our running time heavily depends on the parameter t and thus on . So one might expect that in practice one cannot achieve error rates close to the theoretical bound δ < 0.237 since the running time already explodes for moderately small error terms . However, we give in Appendix C a more refined analysis of the parameter t for moderately small . This analysis shows that our choice of t in Theorem 3 is quite conservative, since we insist on a success probability of Error Correction close to 1. We obtain more flexibility if we also allow for smaller success rates. This in turn leads to a smaller choice of t, which allows to easily correct error rates up to δ = 0.2 in practice. We will use this refined analysis in the experimental section (Section 6).
Generalization
We now formulate a slightly generalized version of our Main Theorem 3. Therefore, we parametrize algorithm Error-Correction such that it allows for a secret key with m components like in the generic description in Sect. 4.1.
So our RSA secret key sk = (p, q, d , d p , d q ) resembles the parameter choice m = 5. We can apply the same analysis as in Section 5.1. The distributions of X c and X b are now given by X c ∼ Bin(mt, 1 − δ) and X b ∼ Bin(mt, 1 2 ). Main Theorem 7. Under Heuristic 2 for every fixed > 0 the following holds. Let (N , e) be an RSA public key with n-bit N and fixed e. We choose (2) 2m and C = mt(
Further, let sk = ( sk 1 , . . . , sk m ) be a generic RSA secret key with noise rate
with success probability at least 1 − (9), (11) 0.206 (p, q, d , dp, dq ) 5 (8)- (11) 0.237
The case sk = (p, q, d p ) can also be handled by our algorithm by using Eqs. (8), (10) with parameter m = 3. The only problem is that we cannot derive k and therefore compute k p as described in Sect. 3, since we do not have information of d . Instead, we simply run e − 1 copies of the algorithm in parallel for each possible choice of 1 ≤ k < e.
Implementation and Experiments
We implemented our algorithm in Java and tested it on an Intel Xeon QuadCore processor at 2.66 GHz with 8 GB of DDR2 SDRAM at 800 MHz. In all experiments we set the public exponent to e = Table 1 .
In each repetition, the RSA secret key was independently and randomly disturbed with error rate δ. For simplicity, we omitted the mounting phase, i.e., the calculation of k as well as k q and k p . Thereby, we avoided to choose the wrong assignment for k q and k p . Instead we just used the correct values for these parameters.
The choice of our tree depth t roughly followed the refined analysis in Appendix C, where we made some manual adjustments for very small error rates and for δ ≥ 0.18. The threshold parameter C was chosen as recommended in Theorem 3 with some rounding. All manual adjustments were made in order to obtain comparability of our experiments, i.e., we slightly tuned to achieve success probabilities in an interval between 20% and 50%. We point out that for small error rates it is easy to achieve much better success probabilities by a small increase of the parameter t.
For each experiment we generated 100 different RSA secret keys and disturbed each of these keys with 100 different error vectors resulting in a total sample size of 10.000 runs per error rate δ.
The tables below summarize our results. We computed the success probability by calculating the term Pr[X c < C ] as defined in Eq. (12) exactly for the given parameters (row "Pr theoretical"). The experimental results perfectly match the exact calculations. In the last row, we give the average running time of algorithm Error-Correction in order to reconstruct a single key successfully. Table 2 . Experimental results for n = 1024 and sk = (p, q, d , dp, dq ) For error rates δ ≤ 0.15 we can easily achieve better success probabilities by using a slightly larger t, e.g., for δ = 0.15 we experimentally achieved Pr[success] ≈ 82% with a modified choice t = 15 and C = 56.
For each run, we also recorded the total number of partial solutions examined by Error-Correction. The following boxplot diagram represents the statistics of the total number of candidates. The thick horizontal line marks the median, the gray boxes describe the region bounded by the lower quartile Q1 and the upper quartile Q3, i.e., half of the candidate numbers fall in this intervall. The dashed lines mark the sample minimum and maximum, respectively.
In our experiments for error rates δ ≤ 0.15, we always examined around 300 candidates on the average and the maximum number of candidates never exceeded 1000 candidates. We omit the box plot for error rates δ ≥ 0.18 since the number of candidates increases rapidly beyond this bound. This is where the exponential dependence of our running time O n 2+ ln (2) 5 2 on the parameter comes into play. The main observation is that for the correct k and balanced p and q, we have 0 ≤ d (k ) < p + q < 3 √ N . This implies that d (k ) agrees with the correct d on at least α most significant bits. On the contrary, for k = k one obtains that d (k ) and d agree on at most log(e) most significant bits. Notice that one can consider D(k ) as a sum of α random variables D(k ) n−i where i = 1, . . . , α, each taking values in {−1, 0, 1} representing the following three cases.
C Practical choice of t
We give a slightly refined analysis of the parameter t in order to obtain some flexibility in tuning the success probability p of Error-Correction. Therefore, we define a scaling parameter α := −5/ ln(p) and modify the choice of t to t := ln α + ln n − ln ln n + 2 ln 10 2 ,
while keeping C := 5t( 1 2 + γ 0 ) as proposed in Lemma 3. The following calculation which follows the proof of Lemma 5 derives a lower bound for the success probability depending on the additional parameter α. The above approximation should be taken with some care for very small . Notice that our approximation gets tight for fixed and sufficiently large n. However, when we use it with realistic RSA values of n ∈ [1024, .., 8192] the asymptotics of the Hoeffding bound do not yet apply for very small . As one can see, the denominator in the exponent of e yields a non-negativity restriction ln n + ln α − ln ln n + 2 ln > 0. This restriction simplifies to > ln n n · α , e.g. for n = 1024 and p = 0.1 one obtains > 0.056. Concerning our experiments, we modified our choice of t manually when δ ≥ 0.18, i.e., when fell below 0.06.
